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I analyze recent debates between proponents of concatenation versus coalescence in phy-
logenetic inference. I argue that concatenation is the latest manifestation of a paradigm
weaving through phylogenetics that has focused on a successive series of models thought to
be justified by the “principle of total evidence.” I analyze the principle of total evidence as
the main philosophical strand linking parsimony versus likelihood (1980s), character con-
gruence versus consensus trees (1990s), and concatenation versus coalescence (2000–10s).
My hope is to provide a foothold for philosophers to engage with contemporary phylogenet-
ics, in the face of the discipline’s bewildering and rapidly expanding array of computational
models.The basic idea of total evidence—include all data that is relevant to an analysis, that
has signal with respect to the problem at hand—is extremely attractive at an intuitive level.
However, the general intuition is less clear in the case that all relevant data are included
in the overall study, but no single method employs the total dataset in one inferential step.
Moreover, simulation studies demonstrate that there are cases in which excluding some
data, even when that data provides signal, leads to a better result by a particular method.
Each of these points is explored through analysis of the historical and contemporary de-
bates.
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1 Introduction
Sterner and Lidgard (2018) urge that philosophers of phylogenetics move beyond the “system-
atics wars”, referring to the 1960s–80s debates between numerical taxonomists, evolutionary
taxonomists, and phylogenetic systematists. Indeed, philosophers would do well to move be-
yond those wars, and to focus even more recently than the parsimony versus likelihood debates
of the 1980s–90s. In this paper I use integrated historical-philosophical analysis of those debates
to clarify a contemporary dispute between proponents of coalescence-based methods (Edwards
et al. 2016; Liu et al. 2015; Liu and Edwards 2015) and proponents of concatenation (Gatesy
and Springer 2014; Gatesy et al. 2016; Gatesy et al., forthcoming; Simmons and Gatesy 2015;
Springer and Gatesy 2016). My intent is to illuminate the present state of the field of phylo-
genetics by tracing the use of one particular philosophical argument, “total evidence”, through
several distinct scientific debates.
I analyze the principle of total evidence as the main philosophical strand linking parsimony
versus likelihood (Section 2: Kluge), character congruence versus consensus trees (3: Nixon and
Carpenter), and concatenation versus coalescence (4: Gatesy).The basic idea of total evidence—
include all data that is relevant to an analysis, that has signal with respect to the problem at
hand—is extremely attractive at an intuitive level. However, the general intuition is less clear in
the case that all relevant data are included in the overall study, even if no single method employs
the total dataset in one inferential step.
Moreover, simulation studies demonstrate that there are cases in which excluding some data,
even when that data provides signal, leads to a better result by a particular method. For example
Talavera and Castresana (2007) found that omitting uncertain sections of gene alignments can
lead to better inference of phylogenetic trees. These uncertain sequences, when analyzed inde-
pendently, converged on the correct phylogenetic tree when given enough time and data. But
omitting the sequences led each of parsimony, maximum likelihood, and minimum evolution
approaches to converge on the correct result more efficiently.1 Talavera and Castresana suggest
that this result is explained by the claim that signal-to-noise ratio can be more important than
the amount of signal itself. In other cases, omitting data may help because error in the data (the
hypothesis that conflicting data are homoplasious and thus not reliable evidence) is conflated
with discordance in real entities (disagreement between gene trees, disagreement between gene
trees and species trees, or evolution within gene trees generating long branch attraction).
Most recently, critics of coalescence-based phylogenetic inference have appealed to the prin-
ciple of total evidence as reason to distrust coalescence methods as currently implemented.
Coalescence-based phylogenetic inference is indeed a newly emerging paradigm, as has been
suggested by Edwards (2009), both for inferring species and phylogeny. Non-coalescence-based
methods may be positively misleading (statistically inconsistent) in the case that there is discor-
dance between gene trees and species trees (Kubatko and Degnan 2007; Roch and Steel 2015).
In contrast, coalescence-based methods use the signal provided by discordant gene trees to infer
species trees (Liu et al. 2015) or to estimate species boundaries (Yang and Rannala 2010; Yang
2015). Though these particular methods of implementing the multi-species coalescent model
have been challenged, most critics acknowledge that methods are needed to handle the chal-
lenge of discordance between gene trees, and between gene trees and species trees (Warnow
2015). Indeed, the challenge is perhaps best described as reconceptualizing the empirical phe-
1. The authors note two situations in which ML does not appear to perform better after problematic sequences
are omitted (572). They suggest (rather unconvincingly) that the particular method of screening sequences would
perform better if more realistic models of evolution were applied to the situations in question. This issue is not
relevant to my arguments, which only require that omitting data in some situations (not all) leads to a better result.
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nomenon of discordance: it can be a problem for some methods, but it can also be a source of
signal to be exploited by other methods. Objections made on the basis of total evidence target
the fact that coalescence methods partition the available evidence in several ways, as will be seen
below (4: Gatesy).
Edwards et al. (2016) objected to the view that coalescence-based approaches are engaged in
a “battle for supremacy” with concatenation methods in contemporary phylogenetics. As I will
demonstrate, the apparent hostility between proponents of concatenation versus coalescence
traces to the earlier phylogenetic debates. Concatenation is the latest manifestation of a para-
digm weaving through systematics that has focused on a successive series of models thought to
be justified by the principle of total evidence. I conclude (5: Cladists) with remarks on some
asymmetries between the total evidence versus coalescence paradigms.
That coalescence-based methods are a new paradigm does not imply that older methods of
studying phylogeny are obsolete or inferior. Just as developmental morphology remains critical
to phylogenetic inference and, more broadly, to the synthesis of systematics and evolutionary
theory, parsimony remains an invaluable approach in many situations. The theoretical and prag-
matic limits of chosen methods should be understood in phylogenetic studies, as in any science.
I have included a glossary with some phylogenetic terminology. I hope that this may prove
useful to readers of this special issue, and I welcome comments—philosophers well know how
difficult it can be to define basic terms.
2 Kluge on Total Evidence
Several researchers have remarked on the uses of Popper by competing sides in the parsimony
versus maximum likelihood debates of the 1980s–90s (Hull 1983, 1999; Rieppel 2008). Kluge
(Kluge 1989) has also drawn onWhewell, (Kluge 1989), Sober (1988), (Kluge andWolf 1993),
and Carnap (1950) to develop his own philosophical arguments regarding the principle of total
evidence.
The principle might be interpreted very broadly as the conviction that all available evidence
should be considered when evaluating a hypothesis or theory. This general principle would need
refinement in light of the Duhem-Quine thesis that whether an observation counts as evidence
is theory dependent (Quine 1951). Carnap’s (1950) intent was to develop an account of the
confirmation relation within the context of a theory understood as a set of sentences (or per-
haps more strictly, propositions). Hempel (1965) extended the principle to the conditions for
rationality of belief. Kluge interpreted the principle in the context of cladistic theory both more
narrowly, as applying to a single inferential step, and more broadly, as a definitive claim about
the nature of science.
The narrow component of Kluge’s interpretation was to apply the principle to the inference
of cladograms. Cladograms express claims about the branching pattern of descent between lin-
eages. Kluge argued that to make and defend hypotheses about the pattern, one must use all
available data in a single inferential step. Kluge further argued that the procedure of maximizing
parsimony was the only correct method available to implement this principle. Then available al-
ternatives included maximum likelihood analysis, which can support results that do not match
the most parsimonious solution(s), and using partitioned data sets to analyze distinct parts of
the tree in succession. Under the latter procedure, distinct parts of the tree are combined to
produce an overall tree, a procedure Kluge referred to as taxonomic congruence.
The broader component of Kluge’s interpretation was that alternative methods for inferring
cladograms must necessarily be weaker than parsimony analysis of combined data sets. Alterna-
tive methods reflect “questionable scientific philosophy” (Kluge and Wolf 1993, 190):
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For example, we believe the methodological strategies of taxonomic congruence
and the use of suboptimal hypotheses involve many decisions arrived at without
reason, and it will not be possible to argue that cladistics is coherent and logi-
cally consistent if those practices become a routine part of phylogenetic systematics.
(195–6).
In this framework, “suboptimal hypotheses” are those that are less parsimonious than the op-
timal solution that is arrived at via parsimony analysis of the total combined data set. Kluge
argued that any partitioning of the data set violates the principle of total evidence and therefore
requires justification; and that such justification is lacking. Proponents of partitioning might
point out that all data is used in the course of the overall analysis, even if no single inferential
step uses all data (Miyamoto and Fitch 1995). While this might satisfy a general prescription to
use all available evidence, data partitioning does not satisfy Kluge’s strict interpretation of the
principle of total evidence. In turn, according to Kluge, methods that partition data cannot be
responsible science.
Kluge later (1997) argued that parsimony is to be preferred over maximum likelihood be-
cause only results inferred through parsimony can be satisfactorily supported using Popper’s cri-
terion of degree of corroboration. However, Kevin de Queiroz and Steven Poe (2001) showed a
way in which Popper’s degree of corroboration corresponds to likelihood. Haber (2005) demon-
strated further problems with Siddall and Kluge’s (1997) arguments from falsificationism and
probability theory.
Kluge’s arguments did little to convince proponents of alternative methods of phylogenetic
inference, but have been cited widely by proponents of parsimony.
3 Nixon and Carpenter on Character Congruence
Nixon and Carpenter picked up the thread of Kluge’s total evidence arguments but offered a
new term for the critical issue,“simultaneous analysis” (Nixon and Carpenter 1996): the single
inferential step that produces a tree hypothesis must use all the character data simultaneously.
Nixon and Carpenter’s target was any procedure that assigns different weights to character data.
Arguments about how to weight characters—how much evidential significance to assign to
each character relative to others—are at least as old as Adanson (1763). Indeed, some numeri-
cal taxonomists cited Adanson as intellectual forebear for their own programme to measure and
weight as many characters as possible in completely “objective” fashion (Sneath 2015). Numeri-
cal taxonomists and their cladist opponents alike tended to gloss over the fact that all characters
are implicitly weighted by the process of assigning evidential status to some observation in the
first place. The same tooth could be measured once, twice, twenty, or one hundred times, or
modeled as a nearest fit function from which parameters could be abstracted, or described in
terms of development or material composition, etc. Discussion of objective character selection
sometimes took on a very loose epistemological and metaphysical tone: “Certainly there is a
boundary between the mind and the reality of any boundary” (Nixon and Carpenter 1996, 225).
The issue of character selection also cropped up in discussion of whether chosen characters
are independent. In some cases the dependence is clear (the volume of the tooth is not indepen-
dent of its width; the length of each tooth, considered for all teeth, may not be independent of
the length of the palate).The situation is far less clear when bothmorphological and genetic data
are included in a single analysis, sometimes alongside behavioral characters and other sources
of evidence entirely (e.g. dating information from the fossil record, biogeographical informa-
tion). With respect to observed characters of organisms, the worry was that scoring separately
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characters that are in fact interdependent leads to arbitrarily assigning greater weight to some
data than to others. Nixon and Carpenter (1996) remarked that ideally each character should
be weighted in terms of the probability that it represents a synapomorphy independent of other
hypothesized synapomorphies. Unfortunately, it is extremely unclear precisely how to do this
in practice. Uncertainty about character independence is one justification for the practice of
partitioning data according to the source or type of data used (Bull et al. 1993; Huelsenbeck
et al. 1994; Huelsenbeck, Bull, and Cunningham 1996; William and Ballard 1996).
Nonetheless, proponents of total evidence continued to urge that there are “compelling
philosophical reasons for combining all relevant character evidence in simultaneous analysis
(Miyamoto, 1985; Kluge, 1989, 1997; Brower et al., 1996; Nixon and Carpenter, 1996; DeSalle
and Brower, 1997; Farris, 1997; Siddall, 1997; Siddall and Kluge, 1997)” (Gatesy, O’Grady, and
Baker 1999).
Nixon and Carpenter (1996) claimed that the argument from “explanatory power” was de-
cisive. Their analysis appears to rely on the premise that phylogenetic inference is necessarily
abductive (see Fitzhugh 2006, Quinn 2016, and Sober 1991 for distinct approaches to phyloge-
netic inference as abductive). Nixon and Carpenter apparently take it that because phylogenetics
inference is abductive, explanatory power is the most essential criterion to evaluate phylogenetic
hypotheses. Explanatory power, they claim, can only be maximized by simultaneous analysis of
all data. By “explanatory power” is meant the link between the phylogenetic hypothesis and the
data, since it is by virtue of the phylogenetic hypothesis that individual characters are interpreted
as synapomorphies (or dismissed as homoplasy). Any analysis of a partition of the data set can
only yield a hypothesis that explains less of the overall data, when joined to hypotheses gener-
ated by other partitions, since the combined hypothesis will produce a phylogenetic tree that
identifies fewer characters as synapomorphies. 2
There are several problems with this argument. Overall the problem is that this approach
prioritizes explanatory fit to such an extent as to ignore the possibility that some, possibly very
much, of the data is misleading. Felsenstein (1978) demonstrated cases in which parsimony
analysis is statistically inconsistent, that is, that the analysis yields the wrong answer with in-
creasing confidence as more data is added. Felsenstein’s critics argued (and continue to argue)
that any method of analysis will be statistically inconsistent in certain situations. This observa-
tion does not mean that Felsenstein’s demonstration can be dismissed entirely, however (see the
recent (2016) editorial in Cladistics for such a dismissal). The critical point is that any proce-
dure of maximizing explanatory fit will be vulnerable to the problem of adding misleading data.
Maximizing explanatory fit therefore requires some thought. Attempts to analyze the signal in
partitions of the data set are one approach to investigating sample error. This is a philosophical
justification for using consensus trees in some situations (Hillis 1987).
The point that maximizing explanatory fit requires careful thought may seem obvious to
philosophers for other reasons. From Duhem (1906) onward philosophers of science have dis-
cussed diverse epistemic virtues as criteria for theory choice. Explanatory fit is often identified
as one such epistemic virtue. Maximizing explanatory fit at the expense of all other virtues, such
as simplicity, scope, or fecundity would lead to problems.
There are also several clues that Nixon and Carpenter favored simultaneous analysis not
for general philosophical reasons but because they endorsed the superiority of parsimony over
other approaches. Certainly Nixon and Carpenter believed that parsimony was itself superior to
other approaches because of general philosophical reasons, but that claim requires independent
support. It is not my purpose here to evaluate such arguments (a task which would require at
2. The only exception is the case in which the partitioned data sets all happen to produce an identical phyloge-
netic tree; in this case partitioned analysis does just as well (and only as well) as simultaneous analysis.
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least a separate paper, and which has been the subject of several books). Rather, I want to point
out the fact that the argument about simultaneous analysis versus consensus approaches was
explicitly identified as the debate about parsimony:
We agree that the simultaneous analysis of combined data is the best approach
to phylogenetic inference: it is the one that best applies parsimony. (Nixon and
Carpenter 1996, 221)
Another way of stating this is that simultaneous analysis of combined data bet-
ter maximizes cladistic parsimony than separate analyses, hence is to be preferred.
(237)
Nixon and Carpenter (1996) also claim that their opponents see the debate in these terms:
The position that datasets should be analysed separately is clearly based on a rejec-
tion of the principle of parsimony in cladistics. (237)
Nixon and Carpenter supported this claim by demonstrating that one form of partitioning data
effectively removes discordant character signal from the analysis. Nixon and Carpenter in turn
equate this with abandoning parsimony:
Viewed in terms of a single dataset with homoplasy, the approach of analysing
character cliques separately, while consistent with the “class” definitions of [Alan]
deQueiroz et al., Huelsenbeck et al., and other proponents of character segregation,
can be seen as merely a way of removing the parsimony criterion from the analysis.
(237)
The particular method of analyzing characters that Nixon and Carpenter discuss, taken from
Alan de Queiroz et al. (1995), does effectively eliminate parsimony as the criterion for adju-
dicating conflicting signal. However, this is not the only method for partitioning data, and it
is not the only way of interpreting the results of partition analysis. As well, it is not the case
that proponents of partitioning datasets were motivated to eliminate parsimony. The results of
partition analyses can be interpreted in diverse ways, including some that are consistent with a
parsimony framework.While Nixon and Carpenter saw the debate about simultaneous analysis
as equivalent to the debate about using parsimony, not all of their opponents agreed.
4 Gatesy on Hidden Support
Gatesy et al. (1999) developed a concept called “hidden support” that they claimed emerges
from the philosophical concept of total evidence. The general approach matches Kluge (section
2) and Nixon and Carpenter (section 3): under the general philosophical principle that more
evidence is better, Gatesy et al. argued to include all characters in the critical part of phylogenetic
inference. Gatesy et al.’s arguments occurred in the context of debate between proponents of
concatenation versus congruence, and later, concatenation versus coalescence. Concatenation is
essentially synonymous with Nixon and Carpenter’s simultaneous analysis, while congruence
refers to methods that analyze data subsets or portions of trees independently of the overall
dataset. Coalescence refers to a specific set of methods that use congruence and that have been
proposed to represent a new paradigm in phylogenetic analysis (Edwards 2009).
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Though they intended their argument to apply to all phylogenetic analyses, Gatesy, O’Grady,
and Baker (1999) defined “hidden support” very specifically in a way that only makes sense
within a parsimony framework. The idea is that combining data sets enables subsets of the data
to provide signal that is lost when an individual subset is considered alone. Specifically, a data
set of characters may yield an unresolved quartet with respect to four taxa (OTU’s) with branch
support of zero, when that data set is considered on its own. When combined with other data
sets, that same initial data set can provide information about a clade within the unresolved
quartet. This is because the additional data sets can provide information about the rooting of
the quartet, and once this rooting is hypothesized, signal emerges from the initial data set. This
is because the rooting information can interpret character states as derived or ancestral. The
signal that emerges from the data subset when combined with all data, versus the signal that
was present in the data subset considered on its own, is called hidden support.
There is no clear analogue for this concept in a likelihood framework. In a parsimony frame-
work, the hypothesized tree diagram and the hypothesized evidentiary status of characters are
mutually confirmatory. The philosophical directive to include all possible evidence might count
as a reason to combine all data sets when running a parsimony-based analysis, in order to maxi-
mize the overall degree of confirmation (and the possibility of emergent disconfirmation). How-
ever, the philosophical directive does not mark a difference between concatenation and congru-
ence approaches independently of the parsimony framework.Thus the measure may be useful in
parsimony analyses, but it provides no justification for preferring concatenation over congruence
approaches in general.
Contrary to my claim in the above paragraph, Gatesy and Barker (2005) claimed that the
concept of hidden support does indeed make sense in a likelihood framework. The relevant de-
finitions were provided by Lee and Hugall (2003) within a strictly model-based approach. Lee
and Hugall described likelihood support for a particular clade (part of the tree) as the difference
in log likelihood scores between optimal topologies that included and excluded that clade. Par-
titioned likelihood support can be used to summarize the contributions of different data sets to
likelihood support at a node in a combined analysis of several data sets (Lee and Hugall 2003).
By logical extension, hidden likelihood support for a clade supported by a combined analysis of
multiple data sets would be the likelihood support for that clade in combined analysis, minus
the sum of likelihood support scores, positive or negative, in separate analyses of the individual
data sets.
While the mathematical demonstrations are valid, the concept of hidden likelihood support
does not correspond to any real biological phenomenon. Likelihood methods work by opti-
mizing evolutionary parameters in combination with an optimized tree. Optimizing subsets of
the data set would lead to different values for the evolutionary parameters. There is nothing
wrong with the assumption that evolutionary parameters have different values at different parts
of the tree; indeed, modern likelihood methods employ that assumption. The problem is that
comparing signal from the same parts of the tree is not legitimate when different evolutionary
parameters are posited on those very parts of the tree.
To take a simple example (see Figure 1), suppose that tree 1 is poorly supported in a like-
lihood analysis that included the set of data [a, b, c, d]. Tree 2, which is topologically identical to
tree 1, is highly supported in a likelihood analysis that included the set of data [a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h].
Posit that the trees share the same character assignments, and that characters e, f , g, and h occur
on the long branch at the right of tree 2. In this case, the trees are identical under a parsimony
framework. Hidden support for the two nodes on the left of the tree has emerged after the addi-
tion of characters that do not, in themselves, provide signal for those nodes. However, the trees
are not identical in a likelihood framework. Different values have been assigned to parameters
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Figure 1: At left, tree 1; at right, tree 2. Explanation in text.
in the distinct trees. For example, the long branches in tree 2 may indicate the passage of a lot of
time, and parameters may indicate that the rate of character change was slow during this time.
In contrast, tree 1 posits approximately equal time passed between speciation events, and the
parameters for character change will reflect this hypothesis.
In a likelihood framework, the two trees in this example represent different hypotheses about
the taxa in question. Comparing the support scores across the distinct hypotheses simply is not
comparing support scores for the same hypothesis given different sets of data.3
In an empirical study, Lee andHugall (2003) noted that hidden support might be evident in
their simultaneous maximum likelihood (ML) analysis of four genes from cetartiodactyl mam-
mals. However, they could not confirm the presence of hidden support because branch lengths
for different genes were not optimized identically in both separate and combined analyses. As
predicted, models that use different sets of data optimize parameter values differently.
It is also the case that in the presence of incomplete lineage sorting (Degnan and Rosenberg
2009), subsets of data are expected to show the “wrong” signal with respect to the overall species
tree. This is because some characters are indeed inherited in an order that does not match the
pattern in which organismal populations split. The phenomenon is known as species-tree gene-
tree discordance (see elsewhere in this volume). There is no way for the calculation of “hidden
support” to distinguish between (1) correct signal being drawn from subsets that yield incorrect
signal on their own, versus (2) incorrect signal being drawn from subsets that yield correct signal
on their own. Thus, concatenation approaches may conflate error in the data with discordance
of real entities.
Coalescence methods account for the possibility of gene-tree species-tree discordance. In-
deed, coalescence methods use the predicted frequency of distinct gene tree topologies to opti-
mize species trees. Springer and Gatesy (2016) continue to argue that hidden support provides a
reason to favor concatenation versus congruence approaches, including coalescence approaches.
However, I have argued that Gatesy’s hidden support arguments only make sense in a parsimony
framework, and only yield the correct degree of support in the special case that distinct likeli-
hood models assign identical values to evolutionary parameters. Gatesy and his co-authors have
not resolved the theoretical problem that concatenation may conflate error with discordance.
3. It is possible that the branch lengths in each distinct likelihood analysis would turn out to be identical. In
this special case, hidden support would make sense in the likelihood framework. This special case corresponds
to empirical situations in which parsimony and likelihood analyses yield the same results. Cases in which branch
lengths differ across analyses will be far more common.
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5 Cladists on Parsimony
I have elsewhere commented on Goldman’s (1990) proof that parsimony can be interpreted as a
special case of the likelihood model. Here I comment on a separate proof, by Tuffley and Steel
(1997), that parsimony amounts to a special case of maximum likelihood. This result explains
why the arguments in favor of total evidence (section 2), simultaneous analysis (section 3), and
concatenation (section 4) make sense only in a parsimony framework.The arguments only make
sense in a likelihood framework in the special case that likelihood results exactly match parsi-
mony results. This may in fact happen in some particular cases of evolution. However, in these
cases, the parsimony calculation encodes a strange assumption about how evolution must work.
To see this, we can examine Tuffley and Steel’s (1997) proof.
Tuffley and Steel begin from a likelihoodmodel.The probability that the data matrix obtains
on the particular tree T , given the model of evolution expressed by p, is the product of the
probability distributions calculated for each data point given the specified tree and evolutionary
model:
P (X|T, p) =
k∏
i=1
P (xi|T, p) (1)
This model assumes a common mechanism for molecular change—that is, that the probability
of mutation is the same at all sites. Other models assign different probabilities for different sites,
for example by assigning higher probabilities to transitions versus transversions (Kimura 1980),
or by altering the probabilities on the basis of relative frequency of bases (Felsenstein 1981).The
Generalized Time-Reversible (GTR) model includes parameters for each substitution type plus
base frequency parameters (Tavarè 1986);GTR+I includes a parameter for invariant sites; and
GTR + I + Γ assigns a gamma distribution of the proportion of substitution rates across sites
(Sullivan and Swofford 1997; Nguyen, Von Haeseler, and Minh 2018). The general form of a
likelihood model can be expressed:
P (X|T, Y ) =
c∏
i=1
P (xi|T, yi) (2)
Wherein Y is the model of evolution, and yi is the particular assignment of parameters within
Y at the branch under consideration.
However, one could devise a model that assigns a separate (independent) parameter to the
probability of state change of each character on every branch. In that case,
P (X|T, pi) =
k∏
i=1
P (xi|T, pi) (3)
Tuffley and Steel (1997) demonstrate that this function will be maximized precisely when the
likelihood tree matches the tree produced by maximum parsimony.
This no common mechanism model is over-parameterized in such a way as to prioritize fit
at the expense of simplicity (parsimony in the general sense). This mathematical demonstration
reflects the above (page 5) comment that the principle of total evidence prioritizes explanatory
fit at the expense of all other considerations that might favor a hypothesis. Here, a resulting
problem is that the overfit model does not fit well with biological theory. Our best current
biological theories indicate that the mechanism(s) of molecular change are not independent
across base substitution type, let alone across every change on every branch of the tree. For
example, we know that rates of molecular evolution are slow within the crocodilian clade. Rates
vary across crocodile, alligator, gharial, caiman, and tomistoma species, and across loci within
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individual genomes. However, the mean rate of base substitution is markedly lower in these
species versus other Tetrapods (Green et al. 2014). The no common mechanism model throws
out this information.
The over-parameterization is problematic in that it violates the epistemic value of simplicity,
and also because it weakens the available evidence by treating individual characters as unlinked.
These problems are more salient than the basic observation that all models require assumptions
that may (and sometimes are known to) violate empirical data.
Some researchers have argued that all models require assumptions and that maximum likeli-
hood and parsimony are on equal footing with respect to statistical consistency (Editors 2016).
Researchers who favor parsimony claim that maximum likelihood requires making substantially
more and stronger assumptions, in order to assign values to parameters within process models.
The Tuffley and Steel proof may be interpreted as demonstrating that parsimony effectively re-
quires at least as many process assumptions as maximum likelihood. Moreover, the character of
the assumptions is more problematic because they weaken the evidence and violate the epistemic
value of simplicity.
The same general arguments apply to ongoing debates about concatenation versus coales-
cence. The “first principles” espoused by the competing sides are informative. Proponents of
concatenation urge care and criticize investigator errors, some of which they take to be glaring
instances of sloppiness. Coalescence proponents urge the use of theoretically-informed method-
ology and genome-scale data sets. Coalescence-based methods involve more inferential steps,
but have been implemented in computer programs, and so multi-species coalescent (MSC)-
based methods are readily available to many labs and students. Pressures to use the greatest
quantity of data together with the newest methods of analysis can result in researchers ignoring
model assumptions and limitations. To the extent that MSC-based methods are more complex,
there are more ways to use them wrongly.The possibility of investigator error when usingMSC-
based methods must be weighed against the theoretical limitations of concatenation methods.
In any case it is oftenmore valuable to assess paradigms over the span of decades or longer. In
the present paper I have traced the total evidence argument from Kluge’s defense of parsimony
to Gatesy’s critique of coalescence. The continuous evolution of this argument, together with
sociological factors (Quinn 2017), are indicators that proponents of parsimony, simultaneous
analysis of character congruence, and concatenation share a set of commitments not shared by
other phylogeneticists. It may be helpful to consider those who deploy total evidence arguments
as members of a shared paradigm.
This total evidence paradigm hasmade a series of empirical assumptions in order to justify its
established methodological commitments. Parsimony and character congruence proponents did
not assume that homoplasy is rare, but they did assume that long branch attraction (Felsenstein
1978) is non-existent (Farris 1983), rare, or at least not problematic in practice. Concatenation
proponents do not deny that gene tree discordance can occur, but they do claim that the processes
leading to discordance are rare and not problematic in practice (Gatesy and Springer 2014).
It would be misleading to describe parsimony as a paradigm in decline. Rather, the parsi-
mony/concatenation paradigm is a strand weaving in and out of systematics, making various
contributions of general use, but also digging its heels in at critical moments. Both proponents
and critics of the parsimony-congruence-concatenation paradigm have produced valuable em-
pirical and theoretical insights in recent decades.
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Glossary
Anomaly Zone
With respect to the MSC, empirical situations are called
“in the Anomaly Zone” when the majority of gene trees
do not match the topology of the species tree.
Clade A group of organisms that includes a common ancestor
together with all of its descendants. Clade is often used
synonymously with “monophyletic group”, and defined as
a group of species that includes an ancestral species and
all of its descendants.
Coalescence The point in a tree where gene lineages coalesce; i.e. the
most recent common ancestor of gene lineages. “Coales-
cence methods” use the multi-species coalescent model to
infer species trees.
Gene tree The branching pattern of descent of an individual gene
within organismal populations over time.
Lateral gene transfer Transfer of genetic material between organisms through
means other than direct parent-offspring descent (for ex-
ample, the transfer of a gene from one lineage to another
via a viral intermediate). Synonymous with horizontal
gene transfer (because the transfer happens horizontally
i.e. laterally between branches on a tree).
Maximum likelihood A statistical method for finding the best fit of parameters
to a model, given a set of data. In the case of the phy-
logeny problem, the parameters include the branching
topology of a tree, the estimated amount of change along
the branches of the tree, and the parameters of the as-
sumed model of evolution; the data are some observations
(such as DNA sequences) among a set of samples. The
basic procedure is to adjust the free parameters of the
phylogeny to find the solution that leads to the highest
probability of producing the observed data.
MSC The multi-species coalescent, a model of gene inheritance
in populations of organisms across time that takes the
coalescence of individual gene trees within populations
into account.
Parsimony The principle that the simplest hypothesis that explains
a set of observations should be preferred over more com-
plex hypotheses. Applied to the phylogeny problem, the
parsimonious tree is the tree that minimizes the number
of required evolutionary changes among the observed
character states in the samples that are related on the tree.
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Phylogeny The branching pattern of descent. When referring to the
branching pattern of descent of species, “phylogenetic
tree” is synonymous with “species tree”. The concept is
also applied to the branching pattern of descent at other
biological levels, notably to hypothesize gene phylogenies.
Semaphorant An individual organism considered at an individual point
in time. According to Hennig (1966), the most conceptu-
ally basic unit of phylogenetic systematics.
Species delimitation The research task of generating and testing hypotheses
about how many distinct species are present in a group
of organisms. Computational methods for evaluating
gene flow and population structure are frequently used to
support claims about how many species are present in the
sampled population(s).
Species tree The branching pattern of descent of organismal pop-
ulations over time. “Species tree methods” (here used
synonymously with “coalescence methods”) hypothesize
species trees, recognizing the distinction between species
trees and gene trees. This has been enabled by the MSC.
Supertree methods Methods of phylogenetic inference that assemble a tree
based on information about sub-components of the tree.
Taxonomic congruence
methods
Methods that evaluate the level of agreement among phy-
logenetic trees or other systems for classifying biological
organisms.
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